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Abstract. This paper estimates the magnitude of, and changes to the subterranean economy 
in Tanzania, as well as its adverse effect on tax revenue during the 1966-2015 period. To 
achieve this objective, the paper applies currency -ratio due to Gutmann and the traditional 
currency-demand approach à la Tanzi. Despite their differences, both approaches suggest 
the existence of a substantial size of the subterranean economy in Tanzania. This persistent 
large size of the subterranean economy is an important consequence of economic and social 
policies over the period of study. Using the currency-demand approach, the paper finds that 
tax evasion is positively correlated with the size and growth of the subterranean economy. 
Indeed, results show that the size of the subterranean economy and the magnitude of tax 
evasion over the 1966-2015 period, are on average, 32.7 percent and 6.6 percent of official 
GDP respectively. The implication of the results is that minimization of the size of the 
subterranean economy is necessary for effective addressing the problem of tax evasion and 
subsequent fiscal deficit in the long run.  
Keywords: Subterranean economy, Currency demand deposits, Currency demand approach, 
Tax evasion. 
JEL. E26, E41, H26, K42, O17. 
 
1. Introduction 
ighting the subterranean economy and tax evasion has been a major concern 
for many countries in recent decades. The subterranean economy comprises 
all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they reported to 
the tax authorities. These are economic activities that contribute to value added and 
should be included in national income in terms of national accounting conventions 
but are presently not registered by national measurement agencies (Schneider, 
1986). Thus, activities in the subterranean economy, also called shadow economy 
or underground economy or informal economy or second economy or hidden 
economy or unofficial economy or irregular economy or black economy or parallel 
economy, are always connected with tax evasion, and factors influencing the latter 
will also always have an effect on the former. This problem has been more 
accelerated by globalization; as this process extends the range of opportunities to 
circumvent taxation while simultaneously reducing the risk of being detected. 
The development of the subterranean economy exists in all countries to varying 
degrees (Schneider & Enste, 2002 and Schneider, 2005). According to Schneider & 
Enste (2002), in Africa, Nigeria and Egypt have the largest subterranean 
economies, equivalent to 77 percent and 69 percent of official GDP, respectively. 
South Africa, by contrast, has the subterranean economy of only 11 percent of 
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official GDP. Moreover, Schneider & Enste (2002) show that, in Asia, Thailand 
has the largest subterranean economy, equivalent to 70 percent of official GDP 
while Hong Kong SAR and Singapore have the smallest subterranean economies, 
both at 14 percent of GDP. In Latin America, the biggest subterranean economy is 
in Bolivia, at 67 percent of GDP, and the smallest is in Chile, at 19 percent 
(Schneider & Enste, 2002). Over the 1988-2000 period, the average size of the 
subterranean economy as a percentage of official GDP ranged between 14 percent 
and 16 percent in OECD countries whereas in developing countries it ranged from 
35 percent to 44 percent (Schneider & Enste, 2002). In Tanzania, Bagachwa & 
Naho (1995) estimate the subterranean economy at 21-33 percent of the official 
GDP.  
The fact that the subterranean economy is associated with tax evasion; it 
weakens the ability of the government to collect taxes. Also, it undermines 
established institutions, and distorts relative prices and allocations of resources to 
the extent that they become less productive. Indeed, the subterranean economy 
competes with the official sector, and in general, misrepresents official statistics in 
which many policies are based (see for example Schneider & Enste, 2000 and 
Gërxhani, 2004). In the same vein, a growing subterranean economy may cause 
severe difficulties because official indicators such as unemployment, labour force, 
income, GDP, and consumption are distorted. As a result, policy based on 
inaccurate indicators is likely to be ineffective. 
As presented above, the subterranean economy is associated with tax evasion 
and avoidance. Thus, it creates tax gaps and reduces tax revenue. This may lead to 
persistent increasing fiscal deficit because the government expenditures grow with 
the overall economy i.e. official and unofficial economies, while public revenues 
grow at the slower rate of the official economy from which the government collects 
taxes.  Unambiguously, revenue generated through taxes ensures sustainability and 
ownership in development process. Taxation has the potential beneficial effect on 
governance and state building. Understandably, taxation is the only viable strategy 
to exit foreign aid dependency. Against this arguments, developing and least 
developed countries give taxation a higher profile in the policy agenda. However, 
the main challenge remains to be high level of tax evasion in these low income 
countries. For example, many professionals operate on cash basis and they do not 
pay taxes to the governments. Property taxes are very low despite the fact that large 
numbers of people own a lot of property. The low revenue collection is also linked 
to misreporting actual sales and incomes by registered enterprises leading to low 
payment of taxes or evade taxes (Tadesse & Taube, 1997). According to IMF 
(2011), the ratio of tax to GDP in low-income countries is between 10 percent and 
20 percent whereas in OECD economies it ranges from 30 percent to 40 percent.  
Tax evasion is a common problem in most countries, particularly in developing 
countries including Tanzania where the information systems are weak. Several 
studies have found strong evidence that tax regime influences the subterranean 
economy. Countries with more regulation of their economies have larger 
subterranean economies. A heavily regulated economy combined with weak and 
discretionary administration of the law provides fertile ground for informal 
activities. These also are the conditions under which corruption thrives. By 
contrast, subterranean economies tend to be smaller in countries where government 
institutions are strong and efficient. Indeed, some studies have found that it is not 
higher taxes per se that increase the size of the subterranean economy, but 
ineffectual and discretionary application of the tax system and regulations by 
governments. By and large, the key factors influencing informal activities have 
been related to aspects of public policy and public administration including the 
burdens of taxation and social security contributions, the complexity of the tax 
system, bureaucracy and regulations, and corruption (see Friedman et al., 2000; 
Johnson et al., 1998; Loayza, 1996; Schneider & Enste, 2000; 2002; Schneider & 
Neck, 1993 and Blackburn et al., 2012). 
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Because the subterranean economy and tax evasion have been a source of 
persistent low tax base and low tax elasticity and buoyancy, and consequently 
fiscal deficit problem, understanding the size and scope of the subterranean 
economy is of great importance to policymakers. In fact, proper policies should be 
developed to reduce the size of the subterranean economy, fight tax evasion and 
avoidance. Notably, reduction of subterranean economy would ensure that 
consumers, legitimate businesses and employees are protected through compliance 
with laws and regulations. In addition, efficiency of allocation of resources would 
ensure increased revenue for the government. However, by its nature, the 
subterranean economy is difficult to study empirically. There is no official statistics 
on this subject and it has to be estimated using indirect approaches. Monetary 
approach is the most commonly used indirect method to estimate the size and 
growth of the subterranean economy.  In the class of monetary approach, the most 
applicable methods are simple currency ratio method of Gutmann  (1977), the 
transaction method of Feige (1979) and the currency demand method of Tanzi 
(1983), based on the work of Cagan (1958). This paper aims at estimating the 
magnitude of, and changes to the subterranean economy in Tanzania, as well as its 
adverse effect on tax revenue applying both currency ratio approach and currency 
demand approach. The paper uses time series data spanning from 1966 to 2015.  
 
2. Review of Literature 
Measuring subterranean economy is a difficult task and those who try to 
measure or estimate it face a challenge in defining it precisely. According to Öğünç 
& Yilmaz (2000), there is no agreement on the precise definition of the 
subterranean economy. The reason for the disagreement is that the subterranean 
economy is not directly observable. As such, trying to measure a unobservable 
phenomenon raises a number of issues. According to Smith (1994), subterranean 
economy refers to the market based production of goods and services, whether 
legal or illegal, that escapes detection in the official estimates of gross domestic 
product. In another definition, Tanzi & Schuknecht (1997) define subterranean 
economy as the economic activities that are hidden from public authorities to avoid 
taxation. This definition assumes tax evasion as the only motivation for the 
existence of the subterranean economy. Similarly, Field & Larsen (2005) define 
subterranean economy as income from productive economic activities which are 
legal and taxable, but on which income tax, VAT and social security contributions 
are not paid, because they are not reported to the tax, social security or customs 
authorities. In this paper, the term subterranean economy is used to indicate those 
activities which are obscured from the tax authorities in an attempt to evade taxes. 
This certainly is the narrow definition of the subterranean economy which includes 
all market-based legal production of goods and service that are deliberately 
concealed from public authorities to avoid the payment of taxes and social security 
contributions, having to meet certain legal labour  market standards, such as 
minimum wages,  maximum working hours, and safety standards, and complying 
with certain administrative procedures (Schneider, et al., 2010). This definition, 
therefore, does not include illicit transactions such as drugs income and incomes 
from other unlawful activities and gambling which are unrecorded in official 
statistics. 
Theoretical attempts to analyze the size of the subterranean economy can be 
traced back to the work of Cagan (1958) on the demand for currency. Cagan’s 
method was then developed by Gutmann (1977) by assuming that the ratio of 
currency in circulation to demand deposits remains unchanged in the absence of a 
growing subterranean economy. The main argument here is that currency is 
regarded as a superior medium of exchange for conducting unofficial transactions. 
According to Gutmann (1977) the subterranean economy of USA was almost 10 
per cent of official GNP in 1976. During the 1937-1941 period, there was no 
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subterranean economy in the USA, therefore, the ratio of currency in circulation to 
demand deposits was constant during this period (Gutmann, 1977).  
Tanzi (1980; 1983) apply similar approach to measure the subterranean 
economy with some modification on the dependent variable as the ratio of currency 
to M2 instead of currency per se. Tanzi (1980; 1983) argue that the demand for 
currency is assumed to be a function of, inter alia, taxes. Assuming that economic 
agents engage in subterranean economic activity in order to circumvent their tax 
obligations then an estimate of the tax elasticity of currency demand can be used to 
calculate the stock of currency held in the informal sector. This approach uses the 
correlation between currency demand and tax pressure, assuming that informal 
activities operate with cash. This implies that, if the tax burden increases and so 
does the demand for money, then that increase in the demand for money reflects an 
increase in the subterranean economy. 
In order to calculate the excess in money demand, the economists behind this 
approach estimate an equation for money demand using econometric methods. 
They control for development of income, payment habits, interest rates and other 
related variables. In the equation, they also include government regulation, direct 
and indirect tax burden, and the complexity of the tax system (see Restrepo-
Echavarria, 2015). 
Many research works have been given considerable efforts in estimating the 
size of the subterranean economy in countries around the world, deploying 
different methods (see for example Ott, 2002; 2004; Ariyo & Bekoe, 2012; 
Barbosa, Pereira & Brandao, 2013; Belv, 2003; Buehn & Schneider, 2008; 
Chiumya, 2007; Blackburn et al., 2012; Dabla-Norris & Feltenstein, 2003; Eikat & 
Zinnes, 2000; Feige & Urban 2003; Hildegart et al., 2006; Frey, Ihendinihu et al., 
2008; Ogunc & Yilmaz, 2000; Chipeta, 2002; Osoro, 1995; Kitine, 1993; 
Schneider & Enste, 2003; Schneider, 2002; and Vuletin, 2008). Unfortunately, 
these methods tend to generate divergent estimates. Many empirical works show 
that the size of the subterranean economy has been most dramatic in the planned 
socialistic economies with maximum governmental intervention. In line with this 
view, Giles (1999) suggests that the size of the subterranean economy has been 
growing over the past two or three decades in almost all of the countries for which 
comparative data have been assembled. According to Giles (1999), growth in the 
subterranean economy is associated with increases in the actual or perceived tax 
burden but also with the degree of economic regulation. To put more emphasis, 
Thomas (1999) argues that a growing subterranean economy may be an indication 
of over taxation and over regulation.  
Similarly, as reported earlier, empirical evidence shows that countries with 
more general regulation of their economies tend to have a higher share of the 
unofficial economy in total GDP, according to Johnson et al., (1997), a one-point 
increase in the regulation index 1 , ceteris paribus, is associated with an 8.1 
percentage point increase in the share of the subterranean economy. It is the 
enforcement of regulation, which is the key factor for the burden levied on firms 
and individuals, and not the overall extent of regulation (Johnson et al., 1997). 
There are a number of empirical studies however, that show a strong impact of 
the tax burden on the subterranean economy (See for example Osoro, 1995; 
Schneider, 1994; 1986; Dreher & Schneider, 2010 and Schneider, 2000; 2005 and 
Cebula, 1997). For detailed demonstration, Schneider (1994) finds out that direct 
taxes including social and security payments have the biggest effect on the 
subterranean economy followed by the intensity of regulations and complexity of 
the tax system. Overall, Schneider (1986) reveals that average tax rate, average 
indirect rate, average total tax rates, and marginal tax have positive sign, 
suggesting that both direct and indirect taxation are the driving forces for the 
subterranean. This strong influence of direct and indirect taxation on the 
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subterranean economy is further demonstrated by Cebula (1997). Using Feiges’s 
data for the subterranean economy, Cebula (1997) finds out evidence of the 
influence of income tax rates on the relative size of the subterranean economy. 
Similar results are reached by Kirchgaessner (1983) and Klovland (1984).   
 Although a number of empirical studies show that tax rates influence the 
subterranean economy, the causal relationship between taxation and the size and 
growth of the subterranean economy is not straightforward. In fact, it is a subject of 
further empirical study. For example, Freidman et al. (2000) find out that higher 
taxes are associated with a smaller subterranean economy. According to Freidman 
et al. (2000), raising taxes by one point2, leads to a 9 percent fall in the size of the 
subterranean economy. The contention here is that higher tax rates lead to stronger 
revenues and better public goods provision, including a more robust legal 
environment, thereby encouraging firms to operate in the official sector. However, 
this argument is subject to discussion, as revenue collections depend not only on 
tax rates but also on tax base and equally important, on tax elasticity and buoyancy. 
Still, even the argument that income tax rates lead to growth of the subterranean 
economy does not go unchallenged. Hill & Kabir (1996), for example, find 
empirical evidence that marginal tax rates are more relevant than the average tax 
rates and that a substitution of direct taxes by indirect taxes seems unlikely to 
improve tax compliance. 
The controversies on the study of the subterranean economy and its association 
with tax evasion reflect the hidden nature of that economy, and that it is certainly 
not exhaustive. The controversies may emanate from lack of a unifying agreement 
on the terminologies used to describe the unrecorded portion of the total economy, 
as well as the method of estimation of the size of the unrecorded economy despite 
the fact that this area of study has intrigued many researchers and policy makers. It 
is very difficult to define and measure unofficial economy in the real world (Ott, 
1998), however, study of the subterranean economy is of very significant. This is 
because the causes and effect of such an economy are of national and international 
interest. For example, according to De Soto (2000) much of the potentially 
productive capital in poor countries is outside the system of formal property rights. 
Wider participation in the formal economy is hindered because productive capacity 
of the economy is restricted due to fundamental institutional weakness. Overly 
stringent labour market regulations have the unintended consequence of 
encouraging more informal labour arrangements as they raise the cost of hiring for 
firms (Singh et al., 2012). Moreover, the World Bank (2004) reports that 
restrictions on hiring and firing intended to protect workers have instead 
discouraged firms from hiring in the formal labour market, as compliance tends to 
be expensive, as a results firms hire informal workers, pay them informally and 
avoid providing health insurance and other benefits.  
According to Schneider (2008), the social welfare system and the welfare 
beneficiaries have high disincentives to work in the official economy. To shed light 
on this argument, Finlayson & Peacock (2002) and Lippert & Walker (1997) 
contend that besides receiving the welfare payments, some people might wish for 
higher income, as a consequence they would cheat by participating in unofficial 
economy since working in official economy could reduce their welfare income. 
Moreover, the bigger the difference between the total cost of labour in the official 
economy and after-tax earnings, the greater the incentive to avoid this difference and to 
work in the subterranean economy (Schneider & Enste, 2000). This suggests that 
social security system and the overall tax burden are key features of the existence and 
rise of the subterranean economy. This also implies that social security payments are 
very important factors when one considering policies that aim at reducing the rise of 
the subterranean economy. In fact, Schneider & Enste (2000) argue that major tax 
reforms alone, even with major tax rate reduction may only be able to stabilize the 
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size of the subterranean economy and avoid further increase but will not lead to 
substantial decrease of the subterranean economy. 
In another study, Ott (1998) reveals that the non-transparency of regulations and 
rules and the concentration of decision making powers in the hands of state 
officials lead to unofficial economy. According to Ott (1998) irrational government 
budget can add financial burden to tax payers thus directly contributing to the 
growth of unofficial economy. Equally important, Ott (1998) argues that 
inadequate penalties against those active in the unofficial economy make efforts to 
control the unofficial economy more difficult. 
Notwithstanding the existing literature, there is little agreement on the size of 
subterranean economy and tax evasion relative to the official economy on one hand 
and total economy on the other hand across the world and within a particular region 
or country. Understandably, there is no agreement on the appropriate estimation 
approach that is commonly adopted to measure the size and growth of the 
subterranean activities. Even within the class of monetary approaches, selection of 
variables and data measurement may differ across studies, which in turn may lead 
to different results and conclusions. Indeed, the skepticism of the correct size and 
extent of subterranean activities prompt further investigation in order to develop 
methods and instruments required to fight subterranean economy which has a 
consequence on government policies and development. In this view, a broad 
understanding of the subterranean economy is required in order to provide 
contribution in literature gap and more importantly contribute to reduction of the 
adverse effects of the subterranean on the economy on government budget and 
foreign aid dependency. 
 
3. Estimation of the Size of the Subterranean Economy 
3.1. The Gutmann Approach 
The Gutmann’s method, also referred to as the fixed monetary ratio or currency 
ratio approach, has been widely applied to estimate the size and growth of 
unreported and unrecorded income in developed nations (Gutmann, 1977; Feige, 
1980; 1986; 1989) and in developing countries (Osoro, 1995; Chipeta, 2002; 
Davidescu, 2013). The method involves the calculation of the ratio of currency in 
circulation to demand deposit which is assumed to have been relatively stable since 
an initial normal period. In fact, this approach was developed by Cagan (1958) and 
refined by Gutmann (1977).  Specifically, Cagan (1958) estimates the demand for 
currency relative to total money supply in the US whereas Gutmann (1977) 
estimates the underground economy in the US by using the currency to deposit 
ratio method of the monetary approach. The Gutmann's approach can be used to 
generate rough estimates of the overall size of the subterranean economy activities 
by tracing movements in the ratio of currency in circulation to demand deposits. 
The assumption underlying this approach is that, there is monetary ratio that would 
have remained the same over time had there been no subterranean economy. Also, 
the method assumes that there was a golden age in the past when there was no 
subterranean economy.  With reference to Tanzania, it is assumed that 1977, the 
year with the minimum ratio of currency to demand deposit (0.64), was 
characterized by a normal ratio of currency to demand deposits. Correspondingly, 
activities in the subterranean economy in that year were, by assumption, 
insignificant. It is assumed that the cash to deposit ratio of 0.64 associated with 
1977 would have prevailed had it not been for the growth of the subterranean 
economy. As reported in Figure 1 and Table 1, the ratio increased after 1977 to 
1.73 in 1999 and declined in the recent years, reaching 0.65 in 2012.  The actual 
Gutmann formula used to estimate the size of the subterranean economy is: 
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where   
SECON = Subterranean economy nominal GDP 
OFECON = Official economy nominal GDP 
CC = Currency in circulation 
DD = Demand deposits 
k  = Ratio of currency in circulation to demand deposits, and 
M1 = Narrow money (currency in circulation plus demand deposits) 
 
Table 1 and Figure 2 summarize the estimates of the subterranean economy 
GDP. The Table shows the absolute size of the subterranean economy GDP and as 
a percentage of the official economy GDP. It should be understood, however, that 
the estimates are biased downwards because the currency to demand deposits 
approach assumes that transactions in the subterranean economy are strictly paid 
for by domestic currency alone. The method excludes values of transactions 
involving barter exchange and exchange of goods for foreign currency. In addition, 
the method assumes that the ratio of currency in circulation to demand deposits is 
constant, if it changes over the years then the change must be due to the 
subterranean economy, however, an increase in the ratio of currency to demand 
deposits can be due to a lower rate of growth in demand deposits rather than a 
higher rate of growth in demand for currency. Despite these criticisms, Gutmann’s 
(1977) approach remains one of methods that are most widely used in estimating 
subterranean economy in many countries. 
Results show that in 1966 the size of the subterranean economy GDP was 
estimated to be 5.6 percent of official economy GDP. It increased to 25.2 percent 
in 1972. This was possibly attributable to the nationalization and introduction of 
controls and regulation by the government. The ailing nature of the economy 
manifested itself in form of corruption, declining output, shortage of foreign 
currency, balance of payment problems, government deficits, and a rising debts. 
These malaises led people to take the risk of participating in illegal activities. In 
addition, many people had to hold cash since the policy discourage private 
investment in manufacturing sector and construction.  
 
 
Figure 1. The Ratio of Currency to Demand Deposits 
Source: Authors’ Estimates 
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Table 1. Subterranean Economy Estimates Using the Gutmann Approach, TZS Million 
Year Currency 
Demand 
Deposits 
CC/DD 
Ratio M1 
Official 
Economy 
Nominal 
GDP 
 
Subterranean 
Economy 
GDP 
Subterranean 
economy (% 
of GDP) 
1966 431.5 590.0 0.7 1021.5 7217.0 402.0 5.6 
1967 539.2 680.4 0.8 1219.6 7356.0 683.9 9.3 
1968 588.3 768.8 0.8 1357.1 7866.0 600.6 7.6 
1969 650.3 931.8 0.7 1582.1 8098.0 285.9 3.5 
1970 861.0 977.1 0.9 1838.1 9173.0 1349.0 14.7 
1971 1049.3 1179.6 0.9 2228.9 9814.0 1493.3 15.2 
1972 1279.5 1214.4 1.1 2493.9 11172.0 2817.6 25.2 
1973 1278.5 1625.4 0.8 2903.9 13103.0 1171.1 8.9 
1974 1608.6 1996.1 0.8 3604.7 15994.0 1617.7 10.1 
1975 1862.9 2591.8 0.7 4454.7 19011.0 913.1 4.8 
1976 2214.9 3260.5 0.7 5475.4 24876.0 596.3 2.4 
1977 2565.0 4003.1 0.6 6568.1 28868.0 13.3 0.0 
1978 3143.5 3911.7 0.8 7055.2 32933.0 3285.6 10.0 
1979 4278.2 6380.0 0.7 10658.2 36283.0 676.2 1.9 
1980 5522.9 8100.0 0.7 13622.9 42228.0 1077.3 2.6 
1981 6950.0 8785.2 0.8 15735.2 51753.0 4768.3 9.2 
1982 8381.9 10334.5 0.8 18716.4 61927.0 6459.3 10.4 
1983 8717.3 12370.1 0.7 21087.4 69522.0 2743.0 3.9 
1984 11341.2 10064.7 1.1 21405.9 85392.0 25348.4 29.7 
1985 13556.6 12551.7 1.1 26108.3 112213.0 30110.1 26.8 
1986 19451.6 17499.8 1.1 36951.4 148391.0 42665.4 28.8 
1987 26328.5 22550.8 1.2 48879.3 329486.0 105981.9 32.2 
1988 33817.0 33698.0 1.0 67515.0 506426.0 112257.2 22.2 
1989 43761.0 41323.9 1.1 85084.9 633752.0 161906.5 25.5 
1990 62284.5 53165.8 1.2 115450.3 830693.0 269222.7 32.4 
1991 70354.8 72321.2 1.0 142676.0 1086273.0 220440.7 20.3 
1992 102459.0 90421.7 1.1 192880.7 1369874.0 411901.1 30.1 
1993 131067.0 124924.4 1.0 255991.4 1725535.0 430511.0 24.9 
1994 187812.5 153316.5 1.2 341129.0 2298866.0 820020.4 35.7 
1995 264208.2 183971.4 1.4 448179.6 3020499.0 1466300.1 48.5 
1996 280575.8 191550.5 1.5 472126.3 3767642.0 1894759.8 50.3 
1997 314487.0 205991.7 1.5 520478.7 4708627.0 2545809.4 54.1 
1998 337323.0 237718.3 1.4 575041.3 6283970.0 2984897.6 47.5 
1999 427447.0 247723.2 1.7 675170.2 7222561.0 4780553.7 66.2 
2000 443050.9 302602.3 1.5 745653.2 8152789.0 4096955.1 50.3 
2001 439261.8 354381.0 1.2 793642.8 9100274.0 3326696.6 36.6 
2002 549184.0 463340.9 1.2 1012524.9 10444507.0 3472606.6 33.2 
2003 619038.2 560333.3 1.1 1179371.5 12107060.0 3431080.4 28.3 
2004 759995.0 651591.3 1.2 1411586.3 13971591.0 4484264.2 32.1 
2005 981420.1 915652.8 1.1 1897072.9 19112830.0 5032566.5 26.3 
2006 1162877.1 952774.1 1.2 2115651.2 23298435.0 8247036.8 35.4 
2007 1354603.8 1428008.9 0.9 2782612.7 26770432.0 5037349.6 18.8 
2008 1710160.6 1719661.5 1.0 3429822.1 32764940.0 7081924.7 21.6 
2009 1896843.3 2024045.4 0.9 3920888.7 37726824.0 6835790.5 18.1 
2010 2298635.0 2624303.7 0.9 4922938.7 43836018.0 6305512.2 14.4 
2011 2694169.5 3336156.9 0.8 6030326.4 52762581.0 5391009.8 10.2 
2012 2682630.4 4123775.9 0.7 6806406.3 61434214.0 394366.0 0.6 
2013 3324794.6 4453155.6 0.7 7777950.2 70953227.0 4612626.5 6.5 
2014 3828376.6 5039430.8 0.8 8867807.4 79718416.0 5817710.4 7.3 
2015 4431833.2 5786975.1 0.8 10218808.3 90863681.0 6971514.5 7.7 
Source: Authors’ Estimates 
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Figure 2. The Subterranean Economy Estimate Using Gutmann Approach, Percent of 
Official GDP, 1966-2015 
Source: Authors’ Estimates 
 
In 1977 where the ratio of currency to demand deposit was lowest, the 
subterranean economy declined to approximately 0 percent of the official economy 
GDP. By and large, during the second half of the 1970s, the subterranean economy 
as a proportion of official economy GDP declined until the Uganda war in 1978. In 
the 1980s the subterranean economy grew rapidly, reaching 32.2 percent in 1987. 
During that period, economic conditions had worsened. Terms of trade worsened 
due to deteriorating traditional commodity prices putting adverse pressure on the 
balance of payments. The shares of investment and of domestic savings dropped, 
while the share of household consumption rose. Also, severe drought in the 1983-
1984 period, forced some people to transact the scarce goods and services illegally. 
It was the depth of crisis such as severe shortages of consumer goods and 
corruption in the business and public services that prompted policy reforms 
including the adoption of Structural Adjustment Policies in 1986. The reforms 
started with the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), 1986, intending to help 
restore macroeconomic balance and stability. Notwithstanding, the ERP period has 
seen either a constant or slightly declining trend in the growth of the subterranean 
economy. The annual levels remained high in the 1980s and increased rapidly in 
the 1990s. 
The probable explanation for the relative growth of the subterranean economy 
in the 1990s is the national wide debate on political reforms and the introduction of 
a multiparty political system in 1992 and the subsequent general election in 1995. 
This might be true because some people were uncertain about the political future of 
the country. As a result, they increased their involvement in the subterranean 
economy (also see Kitine, 1992). 
Overall, during the last two decades, the second economy as a percentage of 
official economy GDP has significantly declined. During that period, economic 
performance has remained stable and strong. 
 
3.2. The Currency Demand Method 
3.2.1. Model Specification 
Tanzi (1980; 1983) developed the demand for currency equation to estimate the 
subterranean economy. In this approach, the influence of the subterranean economy 
on currency demand, proxied by tax rates to indicate the incentive to avoid taxes 
and participate in a cash based subterranean economy, is estimated directly in the 
regression equation associating currency demand and tax rates. After estimating 
this equation, the effect of a change in the tax level on that demand can then be 
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inferred. Like the Gutmann approach, Tanzi approach is based on key assumptions. 
First, the subterranean economy is a direct result of high taxes and second, 
currency is used mainly for carrying out transactions in the subterranean economy. 
Hence, the size and growth of the subterranean economy directly influences 
demand for cash by the public. The main advantage of this approach is that 
monetary data are most reliable within official statistics even in developing 
countries such as Tanzania. 
The model estimated here applies a demand for currency specification to 
measure the size of the subterranean economy by looking at the excess sensitivity 
of real currency holdings to average tax rates (Bajada, 1999). As currency is part of 
money demand, the model has the standard demand for money arguments (income 
and opportunity costs of holding currency) and also incorporates the average tax 
rates and other structural changes in the financial sectors (Faal, 2003). Interest rate 
and inflation are used to capture the opportunity cost of holding currency. 
Moreover, inflation accounts for financial uncertainties on the currency ratio 
arising from instability or uncertainties in the financial sector. Cagan (1958) 
discusses the degree of urbanization as a potential factor affecting the currency 
ratio. However, the relationship between demand for currency and urbanization is 
not straight forward. On one hand, urbanization may cause people to trade where 
they are not known, which in turn reduces the use of cheques. As a result, 
urbanization will lead to an increase in the demand for currency. On the other hand, 
the use of cheques is lower in rural areas than in urban areas where populace is 
more sophisticated. In this case demand for currency decreases with urbanization. 
The regression equation for the demand for currency is expressed as follows 
 
      tdtRtUtPtYYtTC
t
t uRUYT
M
C






  lnlnln
1
ln                          (2) 
 
where 
t
t
M
C
1
 = Natural log (ln) of currency to M1 ratio at time t 
 Y
tT  
= Average tax rate computed as a ratio of total tax to GDP. This 
is a proxy for changes in the size of the subterranean 
economy. 
 P
tY  
= Real GDP per capita  
 
t  = Inflation rate. It captures the opportunity cost of holding cash 
 
tU  = Urbanization 
 d
tR  
= the rate of interest on savings deposits (R). It also captures the 
opportunity cost of holding cash 
 
tu  = white noise error term, i.e. tu ~  2,0 N    
 
C  = Constant term 
 
The ratio of taxes to GDP can affect currency holding by creating incentive to 
avoid tax payments by involving in more cash transaction. Thus, the coefficient for 
taxes
T , is hypothesized to be positive as burden of taxation in the economy 
increases the public will want to hold more cash ceteris paribus. This also holds 
true because the currency demand or Tanzi approach assumes that the subterranean 
economy is more cash incentive than official economy. Real GDP per capita is a 
basic indicator of economic development and presumably the resulting innovations 
in the financial markets. Thus, the coefficient for real income per capita, 
Y , is 
hypothesized to be negative. The explanation is that economic development leads 
to an increase in demand deposits (Shabsigh, 1995) and a replacement of currency 
by cheques (Chipeta, 2002 and Kitine, 1992) leading to a fall in the ratio of 
currency to money. However it is very difficult to predict with certainty whether 
economic development would lead to an increased usage of non cash monetary 
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aggregates. In fact, Faal (2003) argues that a rise in disposable income will 
increase currency demand. Similarly, Schneider (1986) expects a positive influence 
of real per capita income on the ratio of currency to money. A rise in the 
opportunity costs of holding money can reduce demand for money. In this case, the 
coefficients for the rate of inflation, 
 and the rate of interest, R are expected to be 
negative as the rates of inflation and interest increase, the demand for cash should 
decrease. 
Once regression equation (2) is estimated for the period of the study, it is then 
applied to estimate currency holdings by making the assumption that the tax 
variable takes a value of zero. Once currency holdings at zero taxes are estimated, 
they are in turn, used to determine the extent of the subterranean economy by 
multiplying excess currency by income velocity (see also Kitine, 1992, Tanzi, 
1980; 1983; Schneider, 2007; Schneider & Enste, 2000; 2002; Ariyo &  Bekoe, 
2012). 
As mentioned above, the procedure to estimate the amount of illegal money in 
the economy, legal money, velocity of money, the subterranean economy and 
finally tax evasion is well documented in the literature (see for example Osoro, 
1995; Iqhal & Qureshi, 1998 and Ariyo, & Bekoe, 2012). The increase in the 
demand for currency, which in the literature has been defined as illegal money, is 
presumed to indicate the magnitude of tax evasion and it is expressed as follows: 
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The currency to M1 equation with the tax rate. 
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


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
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1
 
= The currency to M1 equation with the tax rate. 
 1M  = Narrow definition of money (currency plus demand 
deposits) 
 
Following Tanzi (1980; 1983), the difference between narrow money and the 
estimated illegal money gives the legal money (LM). Mathematically, LM is 
expressed as  
 
Legal money   IMMLM  1                                                                      (4) 
 
where IM  = Illegal money obtained from equation (3) 
 
Dividing GDP by legal money gives an estimate of the income velocity of legal 
money (V). Mathematically, income velocity of money can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
Velocity  
LM
GDP
V                                                                                       (5) 
where GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
 LM  = Legal Money obtained from equation (4) 
 
Assuming that the velocity of illegal money is the same as that of legal money, 
an estimate of the subterranean economy (SE) can be obtained by multiplying 
illegal money by the income velocity of money. The mathematical expression for 
the subterranean economy is as follows 
 
Subterranean economy   VIMSE                                                          (6) 
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where IM  = Illegal Money 
 V  = Velocity of money derived from equation (5) 
 
Intuitively, when illegal money is used in regular market for transactions, it 
should behave in the same way as legal money in order to appear regular and 
trustworthy. The level of total tax evasion (TE) in Tanzania can be obtained by 
multiplying the estimates of the subterranean economy with the ratio of total taxes 
to GDP. Mathematically, the estimate of the level of tax evasion can be expressed 
as 
Tax evasion  
GDP
TaxesTotal
SETE                                                              (7) 
 
where SE  = Subterranean economy obtained from equation (6) 
 GDP  = Gross Domestic Product 
 
3.2.2. Pre estimation Tests 
Given that the model uses time series data, unit root tests are carried out to 
ensure that unbiased and inconsistent estimates of standard errors are avoided and 
hence avoiding misleading inferences. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is 
employed to test the stationarity of the variables used in the estimation. The ADF 
test in this paper is conducted by including a constant only and a constant with a 
time trend expressed as follows 
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where 
ty is the individual variable at time t, ttt yyy  1 , tu  is a pure white noise 
error term, 
0  is the constant, q is the number of lags which should be large enough 
to ensure that the error terms are white noise and small enough to save degree of 
freedom, t  is the trend variable and 11   . In each case, the null hypothesis is 
that 01   suggesting that the series is nonstationary or there is a unit root. The 
alternative hypothesis is that   01  , implying that the variable is stationary. At 95 
percent confidence level, if the p-value is less than or equals to 0.05, we reject the 
null hypothesis, otherwise we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
Also, cointegration test is conducted to ascertain if there exists an equilibrium 
or long-run relationship between the variables. The Johansen cointegration 
technique and the Engle-Granger (two-step) single equation procedure are used for 
cointegration analysis. The Johansen cointegration model is a vector 
autocorrelation (VAR) based test and it is expressed as 
 
t
k
i
ititt uyyy  
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
1
1
1                                                             (10) 
 
where  is the difference operator, 
ty is an  1n column vector of k-endogenous 
variables that are integrated of order one, and 
tu is also an  1n  vector of white 
noise error term,  is a constant.   denotes the short run coefficient matrix and 
denotes the long run coefficient matrix. If the null hypothesis of no co-integrating 
vector is rejected, it indicates that there is a long-run relationship among the 
variables in the model. This method is preferred to the two-step Engle-Granger 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 4(2), M. Epaphra, & M.T. Jilenga, p.187-211. 
199 
procedure because it can test for multiple cointegrating vectors. However, the use 
of Engle-Granger (two-step) single equation procedure is deemed appropriate, at 
least with respect to preserving the degree of freedom. It uses a single equation 
error correction model (ECM), in which a static regression model is estimated.  
Such a method allows for the possibility of including more than one independent 
variable in the static regression. 
3.2.3. Nature of Data and Data Sources 
This paper uses annual time series data spanning from 1966 to 2015.  Data on 
variables such as currency in circulation, demand deposits, M1, nominal GDP, real 
per capita GDP, total tax revenue, rate of inflation, and rate of interest on saving 
deposits are obtained from (1) A Review of the Role and Functions of the Bank of 
Tanzania (1961-2011) and (2) Annual Reports (2014; 2016) published by the Bank 
of Tanzania. Data on Urbanization is obtained from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, 2016. Urbanization measures the percentage of population 
living in urban areas. Currency is defined as the notes and coins held outside the 
banks where as M1 consists of currency in circulation and demand deposits. Tax 
rate is measured as total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. The interest rate used 
is the bank deposit rate. The rate of inflation is calculated as the percentage change 
in the price level.  
 
3.3. Empirical Results of the Currency Demand Method 
3.3.1. Unit Roots and Cointegration Tests 
As explained above, ADF method is conducted to check for a unit root for all 
variables in both levels and first differences. The results of this test are presented in 
Table 2. These results show that the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected in 
all variables in levels. It is therefore concluded that the ratio of currency to M1, 
average tax rate, real per capita GDP, inflation rate, urbanization and interest rate 
are non-stationary at their levels. However, the hypothesis of a unit root or non 
stationary was rejected in first differences. This also implies that all variables are 
integrated of degree one,  1I . These results suggest that, further estimations could 
be carried while all variables are in first difference in order to avoid spurious 
correlation. 
 
Table 2 . ADF Unit Root Test 
 Levels First Difference, ∆ 
Optimal Constant Constant and Trend Constant Constant & Trend 
Lag = 1 01   021   01   021   
 
  1/ln MC  
 
-1.408 
 
-1.024 
 
-9.822 
 
-9.907 
 YtTln  -2.059 -3.318 -6.561 -6.512 
 PtYln  -1.456 -0.247 -3.002 -3.855 
t  -2.019 -2.225 -7.904 -7.894 
 tUln  -1.997 -1.550 -4.677 -7.892 
d
tR  
-1.208 -1.167 -5.947 -5.981 
     
5% Critical 
Value 
-2.924 -3.506 -2.924 -3.506 
 
Note: Null Hypothesis: there is a unit root 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
Having ascertained that the variables are integrated of the same order, the next 
procedure is to test the possibility of cointegration among the variables using 
Johansen procedure. Maximum Eigen value is used to determine the presence of 
long run relationship between the variables. On the basis of the maximum 
eigenvalue test, the null hypothesis of no co-integration (r = 0) is rejected at the 5 
percent level of significance. Results suggest that there is at most 3 cointegrating 
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vector (r = 3). Similarly, cointegration test results based on Engle-Granger two step 
method, suggest existence of equilibrium in the estimating model. The ADF test 
applied to the error term of the cointegrating equation is integrated of order zero,
 0I . Overall, the results show that the errors in the cointegration regression are 
stationary (Table 4). Figure 3 also confirms the existence of cointegration between 
variables because the disequilibrium error fluctuates about zero.  
 
Table 3. Johansen Tests of Cointegration  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.685242  53.17378  40.07757  0.0010 
At most 1 *  0.602633  42.45311  33.87687  0.0037 
At most 2 *  0.479917  30.07328  27.58434  0.0234 
At most 3  0.354562  20.14003  21.13162  0.0683 
At most 4  0.240095  12.62983  14.26460  0.0892 
Notes: Max-eigenvalue test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
Table 4. Static model: Tests for Cointegration between C/M1 and Explanatory Variables 
 Levels Levels 
Optimal Constant Probability Constant & Trend Probability 
Lag = 1 01   
0.005 021   
0.003 
C/M1 Residuals -4.615***  -4.558***  
1% Critical value -3.571  -4.156  
5% Critical value -2.922  -3.504  
Notes: Null Hypothesis: Residuals are non-stationary 
***denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% critical value 
Source: Authors computations 
 
 
Figure 3. Figure Long Run Contegrating Vector 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
3.3.2. Interpretation of the Empirical Results 
Results for the regression function (2) are reported in Table 4. The preferred 
estimation is an error correction model (ECM). The ECM embodies both the short- 
run dynamics and the long-run equilibrium of the series. It also allows for suitable 
economic interpretation of the results, while at the same time it is robust to 
standard diagnostic testing (Faal, 2003). It is evident from the results that the error 
correcting term,
1tECT
, is well behaved and significant. Specifically, results suggest 
that currency demand adjusts partially by about 13 percent in the short run toward 
its long run value. The diagnostic tests performed on the ECM show that the model 
conforms to econometric theory.  The calculated F-statistic is significant at 1 
percent, rejecting the null hypothesis that all the explanatory variables have 
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coefficients not different from zero. The adjusted R-squared, which measures the 
goodness of fit of the variables, is sufficiently large; suggesting that about 73 
percent of the variations in currency to narrow money ratio is jointly explained by 
the specified set of explanatory variables over the 1966-2015 period. Moreover, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic (DW) of 2.1 fails to reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation in the regression model. Moreover, the diagnostic tests show that the 
error correction model does not suffer from non-normality as we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of normality using Jacque-Bera at 5 percent (Figure 4).  The test for 
functional form (Ramsey RESET) shows no evidence of misspecification at 5 
percent significance level (Table 5). Furthermore, the Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation Lagrange Multiplier (LM) confirms that the residual terms in the model 
are not serially correlated. Finally, the ARCH LM test strongly suggests that there 
exists no heteroscedasticity in the residual terms of the model. 
Econometrics results further show that the coefficients on average tax rate and 
real GDP per capita are positive and significant. Both average tax rate and real 
GDP are statistically significant at 1 percent. The implication here, which is also 
consistent with some previous studies (see for example Tanzi, 1980; 1983; 
Hanousek & Palda, 2007; Osoro, 1995 and Schneider, 1994b), is that an increase in 
these variables have the tendency of raising the ratio of currency to narrow money 
thereby fueling activities in the subterranean economy. Similarly, the coefficient on 
urbanization is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level. The 
coefficient on the rate of inflation is negative and significant at 5 percent, reflecting 
the opportunity costs of holding money. Finally, the coefficient on interest rate on 
saving deposits turned out to be insignificant and therefore it was dropped from 
empirical estimation. 
 
Table 4. Empirical Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 2.404340 0.460454 5.221672 0.0000 
Y
tT
 0.182580 0.045695 3.995616 0.0002 
P
tY
 0.567802 0.087096 6.519265 0.0000 
t
 -0.001091 0.000518 -2.103404 0.0413 
tU
 0.189016 0.042186 4.480483 0.0001 
1tECT
 -0.395588 0.137758 -2.871608 0.0063 
R-squared 0.756299    Mean dependent var -0.312664 
Adjusted R-squared 0.727962    S.D. dependent var 0.055984 
S.E. of regression 0.029200    Akaike info criterion -4.115037 
Sum squared resid 0.036663    Schwarz criterion -3.883385 
Log likelihood 106.8184    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.027148 
F-statistic 26.68921    Durbin-Watson stat 2.135161 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
Table 5. Diagnostics Tests 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 0.619620    Prob. F(2,41) 0.5431 
Obs*R-squared 1.437590    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.4873 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH   
F-statistic 0.182303    Prob. F(1,46) 0.6714 
Obs*R-squared 0.189478    Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.6634 
Ramsey RESET Test   
 Value Df Probability  
t-statistic  0.437279  42  0.6641  
F-statistic  0.191213 (1, 42)  0.6641  
Likelihood ratio  0.222576  1  0.6371  
Source: Authors’ estimates 
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Figure 4. Normality Test of the Residuals 
Notes: The Normality test indicates that residuals are normally distributed as we unable to reject the 
null hypothesis of normality using Jacque-Bera at 5 percent. 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
3.3.3. Estimates of Underground Economy from the Tanzi Method  
Table 6 and Figures 4 and 5 confirm the presence of a large subterranean 
economy in Tanzania. These estimates represent a significant part of overall 
economic activity. Results show significant fluctuations of the subterranean 
economy as a percentage of official nominal GDP, which averaged about 46.4 
percent during the 1966-1970 period and 78.1 percent over the 1971-1980 period. 
Overall, a remarkable size of the subterranean economy is noticeable in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The existence of a large subterranean economy during these periods is 
explained by a rise of urbanization in the 1970s and 1980s which in turn led to 
emergence of diverse range of urban activities. Moreover, the increase in the 
subterranean economy in 1970s and 1980s reflects the excessive government 
regulation and policies.  
The subterranean economy as a proportion of official nominal GDP fell from 
65.5 percent in 1985 to 25 percent in 1987. However, it rose again to 35.4 percent 
in 1991. Generally, the subterranean economy at an average of 49.2 percent over 
the 1981-1990 period and 30 percent during the 1990-2000 period is still higher 
than the levels of the 1966-1977 period. The increase in the subterranean economy 
in the second half of the 1980s was partly attributed to the economic recovery 
programme.  During that time, there was a substantial increase in informal sector 
activities following the decline in real wages and deteriorating employment (Osoro, 
1995).  
In the last 15 years, the size of the subterranean economy took another upward 
trend, rising from 30 percent on average during the 1991-2000 period to 32.7 
percent over the 2000-2015 period. In fact, it rose from 25.5 percent in 2005 to 42 
percent in 2014. The growth of the subterranean economy in the 2000s might be 
due to the restructuring of public sector that saw many employees who could not be 
absorbed into formal employment turn into the informal activities as income-
earning opportunities.  
Figure 6 shows the growth rate of real GDP per capita and the subterranean 
economy. There are appear to be a systematic positive relationships bwtween 
changes in real GDP and the subterranean economy. This also confirms  the 
computed positive regression coefficient of 0.57, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, if 
real GDP per capita increases by 1 percent, the subterranean economy will grow by 
0.57 percent. The implication of this relationship is that cyclical movements in the 
subterranean economy tend to coincide with the movements in the official 
economy. The variance of gowth in both the real GDP per capita and the 
subterranean economy was significantly higher during the 1967-1997 period. This 
indicates that there was more volatility in both official and informal economies.  
During the late 1990s to 2015 the rate of growth of the subterranean economy is 
relative low. Also its variance of growth is significantly low. This may be 
0
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cntributed to the financial sector reform of 1990s and a subsequent establiment of 
many financial intitutions in Tanzania including commercial banks. 
 
Table 6. Size of the Subterranean Economy in Tanzania (TZS Million), 1966-2016 
 
IM LM Velocity SE GDP SE/GDP 
1966 189.2 832.3 8.7 1640.4 7217.0 22.7 
1967 274.6 945.0 7.8 2137.7 7356.0 29.1 
1968 456.6 900.5 8.7 3989.1 7866.0 50.7 
1969 587.6 994.5 8.1 4784.1 8098.0 59.1 
1970 759.7 1078.4 8.5 6461.6 9173.0 70.4 
1971 918.3 1310.6 7.5 6876.9 9814.0 70.1 
1972 997.6 1496.3 7.5 7448.7 11172.0 66.7 
1973 1306.9 1597.0 8.2 10722.8 13103.0 81.8 
1974 1626.5 1978.2 8.1 13150.6 15994.0 82.2 
1975 2220.6 2234.1 8.5 18895.6 19011.0 99.4 
1976 2149.4 3326.0 7.5 16075.4 24876.0 64.6 
1977 2698.7 3869.4 7.5 20134.1 28868.0 69.7 
1978 3414.0 3641.2 9.0 30877.7 32933.0 93.8 
1979 4549.2 6109.0 5.9 27019.0 36283.0 74.5 
1980 5956.1 7666.8 5.5 32806.0 42228.0 77.7 
1981 6220.9 9514.3 5.4 33838.4 51753.0 65.4 
1982 6810.9 11905.5 5.2 35426.8 61927.0 57.2 
1983 9135.9 11951.5 5.8 53143.7 69522.0 76.4 
1984 8074.0 13331.9 6.4 51715.1 85392.0 60.6 
1985 10338.1 15770.2 7.1 73561.3 112213.0 65.6 
1986 13039.3 23912.1 6.2 80918.2 148391.0 54.5 
1987 9774.3 39105.0 8.4 82354.7 329486.0 25.0 
1988 13639.2 53875.8 9.4 128207.1 506426.0 25.3 
1989 20360.7 64724.2 9.8 199364.0 633752.0 31.5 
1990 27220.2 88230.1 9.4 256280.8 830693.0 30.9 
1991 37339.9 105336.1 10.3 385065.9 1086273.0 35.4 
1992 51909.1 140971.6 9.7 504420.0 1369874.0 36.8 
1993 52220.0 203771.4 8.5 442198.1 1725535.0 25.6 
1994 78608.3 262520.7 8.8 688364.3 2298866.0 29.9 
1995 106974.8 341204.8 8.9 946989.1 3020499.0 31.4 
1996 115601.8 356524.5 10.6 1221644.6 3767642.0 32.4 
1997 119022.5 401456.2 11.7 1395999.0 4708627.0 29.6 
1998 124540.4 450500.9 13.9 1737195.2 6283970.0 27.6 
1999 141602.7 533567.5 13.5 1916784.8 7222561.0 26.5 
2000 150634.2 595019.0 13.7 2063948.8 8152789.0 25.3 
2001 173549.8 620093.0 14.7 2546958.5 9100274.0 28.0 
2002 218897.7 793627.2 13.2 2880797.4 10444507.0 27.6 
2003 258941.6 920429.9 13.2 3406039.9 12107060.0 28.1 
2004 326142.0 1085444.3 12.9 4198025.2 13971591.0 30.0 
2005 385418.4 1511654.5 12.6 4873095.0 19112830.0 25.5 
2006 424904.2 1690747.0 13.8 5855165.0 23298435.0 25.1 
2007 632056.7 2150556.0 12.4 7867933.6 26770432.0 29.4 
2008 847801.1 2582021.0 12.7 10758297.6 32764940.0 32.8 
2009 1010287.0 2910601.7 13.0 13095202.7 37726824.0 34.7 
2010 1195416.2 3727522.5 11.8 14058207.4 43836018.0 32.1 
2011 1613315.0 4417011.4 11.9 19271551.8 52762581.0 36.5 
2012 1915266.2 4891140.1 12.6 24056328.4 61434214.0 39.2 
2013 2192772.9 5585177.3 12.7 27856646.6 70953227.0 39.3 
2014 2622663.8 6245143.6 12.8 33477949.8 79718416.0 42.0 
2015 
 
2954188.9 
 
7264619.4 
 
12.5 
 
36950108.3 
 
90863681.0 
 
40.7 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
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Figure 5.  Size and Development of the Subterranean Economy, Currency Demand 
Approach 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Growth Rate: Official and Subterranean Economy 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
3.3.4. Estimating Tax Evasion 
The estimates of tax evasion are obtained by multiplying the estimates of the 
subterranean economy GDP by the average tax ratio. This indicates the extent at 
which the observed tax rates and the estimates of the subterranean economy 
provide insights to the level and proliferation of tax evasion. The assumption here 
is that productive activities in the subterranean economy would be have been taxed 
at the same rate as incomes in the formal economy.  
Table 7 and Figure 7 report the estimates of level of tax evasion in Tanzania 
over the 1966-2015 period. The average size of tax evasion during the 1966-2015 
period, was 6.6 percent of official GDP and 45.9 percent of official total tax 
revenue. This also indicates that, on average, if the subterranean economy had been 
incorporated in the formal sector, total tax revenue would have been higher by an 
estimated 6.6 percent of official GDP per year over the 1966-2015 period.  
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Table 7. Estimates of Tax Evasion (TZS Million), 1966-2015 
 
Tax 
Evasion 
(TE) 
Tax 
Revenue 
(TR) 
Potential Tax 
Revenue 
Official GDP 
 
TE (% 
of 
TR) 
TE (% 
of GDP) 
1966 126.4 556 682.4 7217.0 22.7 1.8 
1967 200.2 689 889.2 7356.0 29.1 2.7 
1968 558.3 1101 1659.3 7866.0 50.7 7.1 
1969 739.1 1251 1990.1 8098.0 59.1 9.1 
1970 1110.9 1577 2687.9 9173.0 70.4 12.1 
1971 1178.6 1682 2860.6 9814.0 70.1 12.0 
1972 1239.4 1859 3098.4 11172.0 66.7 11.1 
1973 2007.4 2453 4460.4 13103.0 81.8 15.3 
1974 2468.3 3002 5470.3 15994.0 82.2 15.4 
1975 3918.1 3942 7860.1 19011.0 99.4 20.6 
1976 2625.0 4062 6687.0 24876.0 64.6 10.6 
1977 3441.2 4934 8375.2 28868.0 69.7 11.9 
1978 6215.3 6629 12844.3 32933.0 93.8 18.9 
1979 4797.2 6442 11239.2 36283.0 74.5 13.2 
1980 5966.4 7680 13646.4 42228.0 77.7 14.1 
1981 5564.9 8511 14075.9 51753.0 65.4 10.8 
1982 5362.6 9374 14736.6 61927.0 57.2 8.7 
1983 9577.4 12529 22106.4 69522.0 76.4 13.8 
1984 8114.1 13398 21512.1 85392.0 60.6 9.5 
1985 12116.5 18483 30599.5 112213.0 65.6 10.8 
1986 11877.8 21782 33659.8 148391.0 54.5 8.0 
1987 6850.4 27407 34257.4 329486.0 25.0 2.1 
1988 10773.8 42557 53330.8 506426.0 25.3 2.1 
1989 19845.1 63085 82930.1 633752.0 31.5 3.1 
1990 25135.0 81471 106606.0 830693.0 30.9 3.0 
1991 41920.2 118257 160177.2 1086273.0 35.4 3.9 
1992 56469.3 153356 209825.3 1369874.0 36.8 4.1 
1993 37522.7 146420 183942.7 1725535.0 25.6 2.2 
1994 65983.2 220358 286341.2 2298866.0 29.9 2.9 
1995 94024.2 299898 393922.2 3020499.0 31.4 3.1 
1996 124427.6 383744 508171.6 3767642.0 32.4 3.3 
1997 149826.1 505355 655181.1 4708627.0 29.6 3.2 
1998 156504.0 566123 722627.0 6283970.0 27.6 2.5 
1999 167223.4 630108 797331.4 7222561.0 26.5 2.3 
2000 173440.7 685107 858547.7 8152789.0 25.3 2.1 
2001 231678.9 827788 1059466.9 9100274.0 28.0 2.5 
2002 259068.0 939267 1198335.0 10444507.0 27.6 2.5 
2003 311075.9 1105746 1416821.9 12107060.0 28.1 2.6 
2004 403468.7 1342798 1746266.7 13971591.0 30.0 2.9 
2005 411830.8 1615247 2027077.8 19112830.0 25.5 2.2 
2006 489160.8 1946432 2435592.8 23298435.0 25.1 2.1 
2007 743411.9 2529439 3272850.9 26770432.0 29.4 2.8 
2008 1106194.4 3368971 4475165.4 32764940.0 32.8 3.4 
2009 1403582.7 4043673 5447255.7 37726824.0 34.7 3.7 
2010 1420006.0 4427834 5847840.0 43836018.0 32.1 3.2 
2011 2144670.5 5871782 8016452.5 52762581.0 36.5 4.1 
2012 2815828.2 7190964 10006792.2 61434214.0 39.2 4.6 
2013 3266802.4 8320821 11587623.4 70953227.0 39.3 4.6 
2014 4118610.9 9807325 13925935.9 79718416.0 42.0 5.2 
2015 4443439.4 10926822 15370261.4 90863681.0 40.7 4.9 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 4(2), M. Epaphra, & M.T. Jilenga, p.187-211. 
206 
 
Figure 7. Actual and Potential Tax Revenues, Percent of Official GDP 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
The estimates of tax evasion as percentage of official GDP and tax revenue in 
the 1980s were 8.3 percent and 53.9 percent respectively. These rates declined to 
3.5 percent and 30.6 percent, respectively, in the 1990s. This declining trend in tax 
evasion as percentage of both official GDP and total tax revenue, especially in 
early 1990s, was a result of measures put in place by the Government of Tanzania 
to restrict expansion of unofficial economic activities (Osoro, 1995). Also, the 
relative low tax evasion in the second half 2000s was mainly due to tax reforms 
and improvement in tax administration which led to capturing some informal 
economic activities into the tax net. Overall, rising tax evasion in the 1970s and 
1980s, reflects the existence and growth of the subterranean economy over that 
periods. In fact, the widespread of the tax evasion associated with the subterranean 
economy has by implication, increased the fiscal deficit in Tanzania.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to estimate and analyze the size and 
consequences of the subterranean economy in Tanzania. To achieve this objective 
both Gutmann and error-correction based currency demand model were applied. 
0 10 20 30 40 50
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
S
er
ie
s:
 1
9
6
6
-2
0
1
5
 
Tax Revenue, Percent of Official GDP
Tax Evasion, Percent of Official GDP
T
ax
 R
ev
en
u
e
1
9
6
6
-1
9
7
9
: 
  
1
6
.2
1
9
8
0
-1
9
8
9
:
1
4
.1
1
9
9
0
-1
9
9
9
: 
  
0
9
.9
2
0
0
0
-2
0
1
5
: 
  
0
9
.8
T
ax
 E
v
as
io
n
1
9
6
6
-1
9
7
9
: 
  
1
1
.6
1
9
8
0
-1
9
8
9
: 
  
0
8
.3
1
9
9
0
-1
9
9
9
: 
  
0
3
.5
2
0
0
0
-2
0
1
5
: 
  
0
3
.3
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 4(2), M. Epaphra, & M.T. Jilenga, p.187-211. 
207 
The Gutmann method makes use of the ratio of currency demand deposits and it 
assumes that there is a monetary ratio that would have remained constant over time 
had there been no second economy. The currency demand model or Tanzi 
approach assumes that activities in the subterranean economy as direct results of 
high taxes. This approach performs econometric estimates of monetary aggregates 
used to finance the informal transactions. Thus income velocity is the same in both 
economies. The two methods yield different results mainly because of the 
difference to the manner in which these two methods calculate income velocity.  
Also, the results may be sensitive to the assumptions made, equations specified, 
and explanatory variables selected.  
Notwithstanding the differences in size and growth of the subterranean 
economy given by the two approaches, the significance of these results remains 
largely undiminished. Both approaches suggest the existence of large subterranean 
economy in Tanzania. The fact that tax evasion is correlated with the size and 
growth of the subterranean economy, the official tax revenue as a percent of GDP 
has stagnated. The loss of tax revenues and the demand on public services by 
subterranean activities, by implication, may be a significant factor for the high 
fiscal deficit and persistent aid-dependence. 
Thus efforts must be taken by the authorities to reduce the size of the 
subterranean economy. Fiscal reforms such as comprehensive reform of the current 
tax system and its administration plus improved provision of government services 
such as land titling and judicial services would likely help reduce the size of the 
second economy. Also, improved governance and stronger institutions are 
important factors for reducing the size of subterranean economy which in turn may 
lead to improve tax collections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 4(2), M. Epaphra, & M.T. Jilenga, p.187-211. 
208 
Appendices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1.  Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation, Equation (2) Tanzi Approach 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 1 -0.071 -0.071 0.2646 0.607 
      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 2 0.155 0.151 1.5478 0.461 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 3 -0.083 -0.065 1.9240 0.588 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 4 -0.021 -0.054 1.9480 0.745 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 5 -0.155 -0.142 3.3183 0.651 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 6 0.017 0.006 3.3348 0.766 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 7 -0.185 -0.153 5.3672 0.615 
      .*| .    |       **| .    | 8 -0.163 -0.224 6.9892 0.538 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 9 -0.089 -0.096 7.4879 0.586 
      . |*.    |       . |**    | 10 0.197 0.214 9.9647 0.444 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 11 -0.070 -0.065 10.288 0.505 
      . |**    |       . |*.    | 12 0.236 0.105 14.059 0.297 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 13 -0.106 -0.111 14.835 0.318 
      . |**    |       . |*.    | 14 0.225 0.177 18.439 0.188 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 15 -0.103 -0.073 19.219 0.204 
      .*| .    |       **| .    | 16 -0.073 -0.256 19.617 0.238 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 17 -0.180 -0.134 22.137 0.179 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 18 -0.070 -0.001 22.535 0.209 
      . | .    |       . |*.    | 19 -0.042 0.086 22.685 0.252 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 20 -0.029 -0.124 22.759 0.301 
Notes: No serial correlation in the model because none of the lag is found to be significant at 1 
percent level.  
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Proportion of Official and Subterranean Economy, Tanzi Approach 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
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